
Fraternity over Nationalism

On the Non-Normative Character of Public Theology¹

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From time to time, I teach a course in public theology where I dedicate the first class meeting to making a distinction between public theology and political theology. Public theology, I tell the students, is concerned with presenting theological claims to one public or another. Those claims might be political, but as often as not they should express the other claims made by theology. The text that guides the Christian public theologian is Paul's discourse with the Athenian philosophers in Acts 17. Paul's discourse is not about politics. Instead, Paul attempts to relate the nature of God to the philosophers gathered at the Areopagus. And, perhaps most important of all, the philosophers are unpersuaded. They scoff and laugh. Luke records that Paul left on that day with just one or two new followers. Preaching the gospel did not carry the day, yet the most urgent task of public theology had been satisfied: the claims of theology were presented to a public. Whether those claims were accepted or not was far less important. Paul was untroubled. He went on to preach the next day.

Political theology is something else. Political theology is the presentation of theology for a political purpose. The purpose can be many things. A theology of liberation is a political theology. The claims of the pro-life movement present a political theology. But so also were the claims of Carl Schmitt as much as the contemporary theologians of integralism. Political theology, in its own way, can have many purposes, just as public theology does. Theology has been used to serve many different (often contrary) purposes down the centuries. But whatever purpose political theology aims to serve, what distinguishes it fundamentally from public theology is the normative quality of political theology. Political theology brings theology to the world in order to amend the world somehow. Political theology presents a claim to politics in the name of theology, and that claim is meant to be honoured.

With this essay, I do not propose to say much else about the distinction between public theology and political theology. Instead, I offer this distinction so that we may appreciate something else. Down the two millennia since the time of Constantine, the Church has acquired a normative habit of a more political theology

in its encounter with the world. The habit arose historically through circumstances, not as a natural fruit of Christian theology. But the habit was acquired. From Constantine to the Reformation, the Church governed and, though the distinction between the spiritual and temporal spheres is as old as Constantinianism, the spiritual power's claim to primacy is just as old. That language corrupts the ordinary presentation of theology to publics, often even when that was not the intention. It is this problem I intend to address here. A normative habit that privileges spiritual claims even when the language of theology does not intend to do so challenges and often thwarts the practice of public theology in the 21st century. The problem is tangled across theology and history. It is not easy to undo these knots. At the same time, in its own way, the problem is quite simple.

We commonly say that the Roman Catholic Church has made its peace with democracy, pluralism, and constitutional government. Most people inside the Church and many people outside the Church have taken that proposition for granted since the end of the Second Vatican Council (1962–65). But the peace is not made. The habit is not broken. This essay only is a descriptive gesture. The work is too vast. However, if this essay succeeds in being persuasive about the nature and the scale of the problem, I shall feel entitled to offer some promising gestures toward what solutions might look like. In sum, those are the hopes with which I embark here.²

Nationalism in a New Light

After philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre died in 2025, I dug out my notes from a gathering of the Lumen Christi Institute at the University of Chicago in 2005, where four speakers—MacIntyre was joined by Cardinal Francis George, Jean-Luc Marion, and Charles Taylor—responded to the question “What can philosophers learn from the tradition?” I had noted how MacIntyre recalled a stray remark Joseph Ratzinger had made at some point. As MacIntyre recalled it, Ratzinger lamented that the Church sided with nationalism in the 19th century. MacIntyre glossed that remark to add that it was a shame the Church had

embraced the “idol” of nationalism rather than finding a way to embrace fraternity.³ The remark didn’t quite strike me in 2005 the way it suddenly brought me up short in 2025.

To begin, we surely can recall that “fraternity” would have been a fraught subject for the 19th-century Church only decades after shouts of “Liberté! Égalité! Fraternité!” had shattered Christendom with seeming finality. In the years since 2005, Pope Francis had begun a theological engagement with and acceptance of fraternity, as seen in his 2020 encyclical letter, *Fratelli Tutti*, “On Fraternity and Social Friendship.”⁴ But here we will address the implications of a Church that embraced nationalism so long ago and that let the embrace of fraternity wait until 2020.

If the Church turned to nationalism in the 19th century, the choice was understandable in a way but also consequential. In the immediate post-revolutionary climate, no doubt the Church would have sought some promise of continuity with the previous centuries’ arrangements of Christendom. Where once the Church exerted influence through the Christian monarchs over whom it claimed spiritual jurisdiction, now the Church would claim its place in partnership with nationalist leaders or, in democratic states, even seek to maintain its political influence through the participation of Catholic citizens.

At this point it seems useful to say a word about what we can surmise MacIntyre meant by “nationalism,” for certainly there are important differences between the nationalism of Franco and the nationalism of the United States. We want to focus our attention on what they have in common. I rely here on the definition offered by Peter Alter: “In nationalism, the nation is placed upon the highest pedestal; its value resides in its capacity as the sole, binding agency of meaning and justification.”⁵ As Alter’s treatment of the topic affirms, nationalism was a creation of the modern world. The modern national state did not exist before the Reformation era, and it was only reaching maturity in the 19th century. Therefore, at least one consequence worth noting is the way that in embracing nationalism, the Church also embraced the modern world. The modern state did not exist when the Church formed in the last centuries of the Roman Empire, nor did it exist during the medieval period of Christendom. For these reasons, first, it is telling that the Church would embrace nationalism in the 19th century. The embrace gives an appearance of using what the modern world provided to maintain continuity with Christendom. I would note, second, that the strangeness of embracing a characteristic of the modern world as a mode of resisting the encroachments of the modern world on the Church’s temporal power discloses something to us about motivation and context.

It is common today to speak of Christian nationalism, the organization of political power of a national state around the political theology of the Christian revelation. For the Roman Catholic Church, it is somewhat different, because for the Catholic Church this is a project of recovery more than aspiration.⁶ The Church in Rome enjoyed considerable temporal power during the age of Christendom, from the fall of Rome until the Reformation. Still, in substance, the hopes of the new integralists are the same as the Christian nationalists.⁷ Quoting from Louis Bouyer, Timothy Troutner characterizes the particularly Catholic variety of those hopes as “‘absolutization of authority,’ ‘petrifying of tradition,’ and nostalgic longing for the Church to wield political power as it did in the Christendom of old.”⁸ The old dream of integrated spiritual and temporal power under the Church never fully went away.

An Eschatology of the Nation

It is true that Pope John Paul II embraced solidarity (a Francis synonym for fraternity) much earlier than *Fratelli Tutti* in his 1987 encyclical, *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis*. But as quickly as we draw some relief from John Paul, we should consider a long quotation from a different source in his writings—a quotation that may raise some alarm. It suggests not just the embrace of nationalism by the Church but what motivates that embrace. John Paul wrote:

The history of every individual, and therefore of every people, possesses a markedly eschatological dimension.... The eschatological aspect means that human life makes sense and the history of nations also makes sense. Admittedly it is people and not nations that have to face God’s judgment, but in the judgment pronounced on individuals, nations too are in some way judged. Can there be such a thing as an eschatology of the nation? Nations have an exclusively historical meaning, whereas man’s vocation is eschatological. Yet man’s vocation leaves its mark on the history of nations.... In the light of these considerations we can now clarify further the concept of “native land.”⁹

This is from a 2005 book John Paul wrote as an individual—*Memory and Identity: Conversations at the Dawn of a Millennium*—and it is not an authoritative statement that arises from the Petrine office. Still, John Paul’s later reflections point toward the larger dimensions of the problem that was largely unexamined across decades and centuries.

Many years earlier, in remarks he offered at a UNESCO meeting on the role of culture in the life of nations, John Paul was careful to say that “What I say here concerning the right of the nation to the foundation of

its culture and its future is not, therefore, the echo of any ‘nationalism,’ but it is always a question of a stable element of human experience and of the humanistic perspective of man’s development.”¹⁰ But there are reasons why that qualification should not soothe concerns. Nationalism existed long before John Paul II was elected in 1978. Yet, to essentialize national identity in this way with eschatological significance seems extraordinary. Perhaps, though, it is not so surprising when we begin to untangle the long and difficult time the Roman Catholic Church has had with the modern world and especially with the meaning of national community since the Peace of Westphalia. Settling once and for all that a civil government controls what happens inside its borders, Westphalia thwarted the claims of supranational Christendom. The long struggle over the separation of church and state was underway, and the trouble perhaps was that the Church had spent so many centuries from Eusebius to Bellarmine conditioning its identity on establishing Christendom.

In an especially important passage in his 1961 encyclical, *Mater et Magistra*, Pope John XXIII writes how “groups must themselves necessarily present the form and substance of a true community, and this will only be the case if they treat their individual members as human persons and encourage them to take an active part in the ordering of their lives.”¹¹ It is perhaps the first place where the Church begins at the level of authoritative teaching to grapple with the challenge of moving past Christendom as its aspirational model for social and political life. We know John XXIII was alert to the need for bringing the Church up to pace with the modern world; otherwise, he would not have convoked the Second Vatican Council, which was in preparation when *Mater et Magistra* appeared. The encyclical named itself as concerned with “Christianity and Social Progress,” and it abounds with fresh expressions about the Church’s relationship to the world. Yet, not all of them are so fresh, and many problems remain.

That passage from paragraph 65 is important because it deals with the most bedeviling problem in the Church’s engagement with modern constitutional states: the common good. The phrase “common good” sounds benign. A few years after *Mater et Magistra*, the Second Vatican Council rather helpfully defined this term, which is a very old idea nurtured from Aristotle and Aquinas, in a modern-seeming way. Its Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (*Gaudium et Spes*) tells us that the common good is “the sum of those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment.”¹² Very few people of any religious faith or no religious faith would disagree. But the Aristotelian

and Thomist language about the common good signals trouble just as much as the Aristotelian and Thomist language we find in *Mater et Magistra*: “the form and substance of a true community.” John XXIII is writing in paragraph 65 of the encyclical about social groups. The larger context is revealing:

We consider it altogether vital that the numerous intermediary bodies and corporate enterprises—which are, so to say, the main vehicle of this social growth—be really autonomous, and loyally collaborate in pursuit of their own specific interests and those of the **common good**. For these groups must themselves necessarily present the form and substance of a **true community**, and this will only be the case if they treat their individual members as human persons and encourage them to take an active part in the ordering of their lives.¹³

As before, most people will agree. But it is the relationship between “common good” and “true community” that needs to concern us.

The critical question comes when we ask who determines what is “true,” what is the “good” of the “common good.” Is it something that can be settled at the ballot box because “Praise is due to those national procedures which allow the largest possible number of citizens to participate in public affairs with genuine freedom,” as *Gaudium et Spes* tells us?¹⁴ Or could we define the common good in a constitution because John XXIII praised “the observance of constitutional procedures” in *Pacem in Terris*?¹⁵ But maybe we could ask the question this way instead: What if every citizen of a plural political community like the United States does not share the moral vision of the Roman Catholic Church? Quickly we discover that the Church does not think the common good is actually susceptible to being identified by a deliberation of the whole community in freedom or a judicial finding about the meaning of a constitutional provision. Rather, the common good has objective moral and ethical content. And, at least theologically, whatever falls outside the boundaries of that objective understanding named in the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church fails to be the common good. That would be despite how the Second Vatican Council found to be “greatly in accord with truth and justice” the fact that “the demand is increasingly made that men should act on their own judgment.”

Immediately after, *Dignitatis Humanae* “professes its belief that it is upon the human conscience that these obligations fall and exert their binding force ... [and that] Religious freedom, in turn ... has to do with immunity from coercion in civil society.”¹⁶ If one has a religious conviction that is at odds with how the Roman Catholic Church understands, for example,

abortion or euthanasia (as even many believers do), we know that the Church will not acknowledge that conscientious position as fitting within the scope of the common good (or, we might add, religious liberty). Such things are beyond democratic and constitutional settlement under our theology still today.¹⁷ The “true community” in our theology still is one that will not permit the common good to be defined in the way that democratic and constitutional states—republics—most ordinarily think about the common good as being identified by all of the people together in some democratic or constitutional act. And so, there is an unresolved tension here. It is not between our moral theology and how Catholicism understands the state. That is the surface of a conflict that runs much deeper. The deeper conflict is at the level of how the Church understands what a community is.

Authentic and Correct

This is a précis of a very large and mostly subterranean problem. One finds it peeking out from beneath things the Church says (and does not say) with startling frequency once one begins to listen for it. Listen to John Paul II in his otherwise wonderful 1991 encyclical, *Centesimus Annus*: “**Authentic** democracy is possible only in a State ruled by law, and on the basis of a **correct** conception of the human person.”¹⁸ Notice those qualifiers and take them seriously—“authentic” and “correct.” He goes on with an astonishingly cranky complaint:

Nowadays there is a tendency to claim that agnosticism and sceptical relativism are the philosophy and the basic attitude which correspond to democratic forms of political life. Those who are convinced that they know the truth and firmly adhere to it [Catholics] are considered unreliable from a democratic point of view, since they do not accept that truth is determined by the majority, or that it is subject to variation according to different political trends. It must be observed in this regard that if there is no ultimate truth to guide and direct political activity, then ideas and convictions can easily be manipulated for reasons of power. As history demonstrates, a democracy without values easily turns into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism.¹⁹

For faithful Roman Catholics, perhaps this poses no problem. But this is not good news for other citizens in our community with different belief systems arising from different faiths or no faith.

At this point, it becomes important to return to the earlier discussion about nationalism and how the Church embraced it in the 19th century—particularly John Paul II’s suggestion that there could be an “eschatol-

ogy of the nation,” which tells us something about how the Church thinks about nation and community. John Paul’s construction of this eschatology is revealing: “man’s vocation leaves its mark on the history of nations.” His 1983 *Catechism of the Catholic Church* tells us that the fundamental vocation of every human being is the call to holiness—a deep personal relationship with God and a life lived in accordance with God’s will.²⁰ This is an undifferentiated claim that does not exclude non-Catholics. And so, when John Paul wrote later about “Poland’s baptism” at the time when the gospel came to Poland “around the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries” as “not simply referring to the sacrament of Christian initiation ... but also to the event which was decisive for the birth of the nation and the formation of Poland’s Christian identity,” he was explicitly including all Poles, Christian or not.²¹ Yet, we know from the testimony of a contemporary Andalusian trader, Ibrahim ibn Yaqub, that “Christian” Poland certainly included Jews and probably others.²² As he was a student of Poland’s past, it would be surprising if John Paul did not know about the presence of other believers at the time of “Poland’s baptism.” And, without impugning John Paul or his motivations, especially where the Catholic relationship to Judaism is concerned, it seems necessary to point out how unexamined a lot of assumptions about community and nation are in the Catholic Church. Those unexamined assumptions arise from a long history of aspirational Christendom that does not correspond closely to the gospel or even to recent authoritative teaching. They have consequences for how the Church engages the world, and those consequences are an immediate concern for the public theologian.

Fraternity and Public Theology

There are many opportunities in Catholic theology to identify a better conception of community and nation that can accommodate the reality of the modern world without abandoning what Catholics believe. There also are obstacles, the largest of which is the underdeveloped state of the question that prevents us from seeing its true character not as a moral problem for the individual voter or the individual Catholic politician, but a theological problem for the whole Church.

Being the Church that could prefer to embrace nationalism in the 19th century is a problem we still are living with in the 21st century. Because the effects of that embrace linger, our public theology has a counterproductively normative quality. Too often it is political theology, really. The Church still claims authority to determine the shape of the world and its possibilities for people who do not believe in our revelation. How the Church reached this point was understandable. Fraternity was tainted by Revolution. Nationalism, on the other hand, offered a way to hold

on to the temporal and civil power Christendom once made possible, presuming the Church could exercise control through Catholic states, Catholic leaders, and even Catholic voters. That hope has been visible not just in Franco's Spain but, in a different way, in efforts to deny communion to Catholic politicians in the US. Still, nationalism was the wrong choice, built on centuries of flawed assumptions. They are assumptions of a political theology rooted in the moral claims of the Catholic Church, claims that every Catholic believes and that the Church contends are apprehensible to the reason of any person of good faith. But those assumptions bring more trouble than it first appears within the contexts of plural societies or modern constitutional governments. They look a lot like the way nationalism was adapted in the 19th century to maintain the Church's temporal power. They have a stubbornly normative quality.

Therefore, those assumptions will frustrate public theology so long as the plurality of modern social communities at least equals if not exceeds the plurality of the 11th century's "Christian" Poland. Telling the people of modern political communities that their consciences agree with the moral claims of Catholicism will look very much like baptizing Poland despite its plurality. It is an aggrandizing claim that will look like yet another effort to make normative claims in the temporal realm. Especially after so much history, it only can arouse suspicion that will make the Church's wider revelatory message harder for people to hear.

Better choices still exist. Pope Francis has given us permission to think in terms of fraternity, and in *Fratelli Tutti* he gave us an elegant and fruitful reflection on what it means to be a people in the sense of a community or a nation.²³ That reflection tells us that our community arises from "social and cultural bonds," not normative claims of faith.²⁴ Francis asks us to encounter one another as friends. Dialogue is the method that Francis suggests. Dialogue means really listening more than it means explaining; and, critically, it "involves the ability to respect the other's point of view and to admit that it may include legitimate convictions and concerns."²⁵ Yet, such attention to relationships builds bonds that lead us together in new directions. Beginning from that sense of fraternity nurtured in social life or culture perhaps does entail some risks for the Church as it proclaims its gospel and seeks to promote the dignity of every human person from conception to natural death. It means that the Church will need to win people over instead of presenting them with normative assertions. But this is an approach that accords better not only with the ethos of constitutional government and free societies as we know them, but also with that dignity of conscience praised so fulsomely by the Church at Vatican II. It sets the Church in

place as accompanying the people of the world more than determining their futures.

Fraternity is greater than nationalism, socially and theologically. Fraternity offers an approach that will make the task of the public theologian both easier and more effective. And, in this way, it will be for public theologians both to show the world what the Church can offer and to show the Church how it can best make that offer.

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1 A portion of this essay is adapted from a presentation given on August 11, 2025, as a contribution to "The Future of Catholicism Symposium" at the annual meeting of the Association of the Sociology of Religion in Chicago, IL.

2 This essay was prepared before the release of Leo XIV's 2026 encyclical, *Magnifica Humanitas*, in which he takes a step toward addressing the problem treated here. Gesturing toward the literature of political theory with a quotation from Hannah Arendt, Leo describes democracy in paragraph 134 as "a means of contributing to the common good" and helpfully characterizes democracy as more than "rules and principles alone, but above all as a solid concordance with the facts and a genuine commitment to the good of individuals and society as a whole." That acknowledgement is a step, but it is still insufficient as a theological remedy to the problem this essay addresses. Leo has opened the door wider for theologians to describe how and why the Church can accept modern constitutional forms of government. This essay accepts that invitation.

3 Alasdair MacIntyre, "What Can Philosophers Learn from the Tradition?" public conversation, Lumen Christi Institute, University of Chicago, April 30, 2005. MacIntyre may have been thinking of Ratzinger's remarks to the Italian Senate on May 12, 2004, which appeared later as "Europe and Its Discontents" in *First Things* 159 (2006), and later in *Without Roots: Europe, Relativism, Christianity, Islam* (New York: Basic Books, 2007). In "Europe and Its Discontents," Ratzinger lamented the way "technology, nationalism, and militarism" had overtaken Europe since the French Revolution (19). If we look back farther, Ratzinger expressed similar ideas in a 1962 lecture, published later as *The Unity of Nations: A Vision of the Church Fathers* (Washington, DC: CUA Press, 2015), in which he argued that Christianity "was revolutionary in an ultimate sense, since it could not be identified with any state but was, rather, a force that relativized everything that was included in the world by pointing to the one absolute God and to the one mediator between God and [humanity], Jesus Christ" (115–16). Ratzinger wanted to highlight how Christianity's universality disrupts particular national claims and in turn how its universal character renders Christianity revolutionary in a sense that is more subversive than Jacobins or (presumably) Marxists could imagine. The lamentation about choosing nationalism over fraternity seems to have been MacIntyre's own response to Ratzinger. Whatever its relationship to Ratzinger's ideas, MacIntyre's gloss was my own starting point for these reflections.

4 See Francis, *Fratelli Tutti* – On Fraternity and Social Friendship (2020), https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20201003_enciclica-fratelli-tutti.html.

5 Peter Alter, *Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (New York: Arnold, 1985), 5. Alter's work is 40 years old yet retains its place as an essential treatment of nationalism. Certainly, part of the reason owes to the care Alter takes with defining nationalism. His effort begins with addressing head-on "Problems of Definition" on page 1. Those problems are real. Yet, here, the definition Alter himself settles on serves our purpose well.

6 See Steven P. Millies, “‘Pick One of Those Pieces Up and Begin Again’: The New Integralism and the Persistence of a Dream of Christendom,” in *Understanding Christian Nationalism: Perspectives on the Political Religion of Trump’s America*, ed. Mark R. Silk and Rhys H. Williams (New York: Routledge, 2026), 112–28.

7 For a brief but excellent treatment of the new integralists that places them in historical context, see Timothy Troutner, “The New Integralists: What They Get Wrong, and Why We Can’t Ignore Them,” *Commonweal* 147, no. 10 (November 2020), 32–37. To find the hopes and ambitions of the new integralists presented in full, see Thomas Crean and Alan Fimister, *Integralism: A Manual of Political Philosophy* (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2020); Adrian Vermeule, *Common Good Constitutionalism: Recovering the Classical Legal Tradition* (Medford, MA: Polity Press, 2022).

8 Louis C. Bouyer, *The Decomposition of Catholicism*, trans. Charles Underwood Quinn (Cincinnati: Franciscan Herald Press, 1969), 71, quoted in Troutner, “The New Integralists,” 32.

9 John Paul II, *Memory and Identity: Conversations at the Dawn of a Millennium* (New York: Rizzoli, 2005), 75–76.

10 John Paul II, “Address of John Paul II to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),” June 2, 1980, https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/it/speeches/1980/june/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19800602_unesco.html.

11 John XXIII, *Mater et Magistra* – On Christianity and Social Progress (1961), 65, https://www.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_15051961_mater.html.

12 Paul VI, *Gaudium et Spes* – Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (1965), 26, https://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html.

13 John XXIII, *Mater et Magistra*, 65. (Emphasis added.)

14 Paul VI, *Gaudium et Spes*, 31.

15 John XXIII, *Pacem in Terris* – On Establishing Universal Peace in Truth, Justice, Charity and Liberty (1963), 79, https://www.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem.html.

16 Paul VI, *Dignitatis Humanae* – Declaration on Religious Freedom (1965), 1, https://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html.

17 See Leo XIV, *Magnifica Humanitas* – On Safeguarding the Human Person in the Time of Artificial Intelligence (2026), 55–56, <https://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiv/en/encyclicals/documents/20260515-magnifica-humanitas.html>. “Human rights are inviolable, since they are ‘inherent in the human person and in human dignity.’ Consequently, they are universal and inalienable. Precisely because they are grounded in the common dignity of every man and woman, they have practical consequences and legal effects, for ‘it would be vain to proclaim human rights if, at the same time, everything were not done to ensure the duty of respecting them, respect by all, in all places and for all.’ Among these rights, the first is the right to life, from conception to its natural end, without which it is impossible to exercise any other right. When this fundamental right is denied — as in the cases of induced abortion, killing of the innocent and euthanasia — we are faced with choices that the Church considers gravely wrong. Looking at our own time, we cannot ignore the fact that the protection of human rights has been exposed to two particularly serious dangers. The first is that these rights are declared in a purely formal sense, while technological progress continues alongside covert or overt violations of human dignity. The second, which is in fact the root of the first, is the inability to recognize the foundation of their universality, since we have abandoned ‘the search for the solid foundations sustaining our decisions and our laws.’”

18 John Paul II, *Centesimus Annus* – On the Hundredth Anniversary of *Rerum Novarum* (1991), 46, https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus.html. (Emphasis added.)

19 John Paul II, *Centesimus Annus*, 46.

20 *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 2nd ed. (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1997), cf. 1700, 1719.

21 John Paul II, *Memory and Identity*, 76–77ff.

22 See Dmitrij Mishin, “Ibrahim Ibn-Ya-Qub At-Turtushi’s Account of the Slavs from the Middle of the Tenth Century,” *Annual of Medieval Studies at the CEU 1994–1995* (Central European University: Budapest, 1996), 184–99.

23 See Francis, *Fratelli Tutti*, 154–97.

24 Francis, *Fratelli Tutti*, 158.

25 Francis, *Fratelli Tutti*, 203.